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Abstract
Universals appear to be as central in today’s computational-based ontology
as they were in medieval ontological investigations. As the author of a recent
work on the history of universals (Pinzani, 2018), I was asked for a commentary
on Augusto’s article “Bridging Mainstream and Formal Ontology” (Augusto,
2021), which aims at showing that medieval ontological investigations can be
relevant for contemporary ontology engineering. In this commentary, I begin
by saying something about my way of reading 12th-century logical literature
and then offer some modest considerations on the general theme addressed in
Augusto’s article.
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1 Interpretative Insights
At the origin of the problem of universals there is the need to justify the truth of a
statement.1 The semantic turn of the 12th century takes place in the context of a
scholastic discussion on this problem.2 The goal of semantic analysis is to define the
conditions of truth, having assigned meanings to the components of the sentences. In
the philosophical tradition from the early Middle Ages to the present day, the prevail-
ing idea is that the assigned meanings are composed in accordance with syntactical
composition and what is thought to be the order of things. But what is the order of
things? A philosopher thinks he knows that and can choose between meanings or, if
one likes, between different ontologies; he can explain how objects can be composed.
∗On the sidelines of L. M. Augusto’s article (Augusto, 2021).
†B roberto.pinzani@unipr.it
1See Pinzani (2018).
2See de Libera (1996).
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12th-century scholars, in commenting Boethius’ logical works, are engaged in this
enterprise.
I do not believe that it can be said that semantics and traditional Boethian on-
tology are divergent. The idea that looking for meaning can be less demanding than
looking for universal things is often misleading and does not explain how the seman-
ticist approach of the 12th century is so closely linked to the metaphysical positions
of the authors. This is an observation that concerns medieval logic, but it suffices to
read the most recent literature to be convinced that the interplay between the theory
of meaning and metaphysics is a constant in the history of semantics, even in the
modern and contemporary times. In any case, between the end of the 11th century
and the beginning of the 12th, thanks to the complete knowledge of the Boethian
commentaries (sd/1906) and the discovery of significant sections of the works of the
Latin grammarians, the use of semantic terminology is pervasive.
The cultural environment is that of Boethius’ commentaries enriched by contem-
porary studies on Latin grammarians. From these derives a certain way of reading
authoritative texts and the philosophical problems they pose, in particular the ques-
tion of genera and species. The semantic equipment seems primitive, as can be seen
from Table 1; however, if one looks at the subsequent history, one will not find much
more, a curious fact that needs to be taken into account.




“man” Any man Being man
“stone” Any stone Being stone
“grammarian” Any grammarian Grammar
“laugh(s)” S/he who laughs Laughing
The terminology is variable, the main technical terms being: “nominatio”, “demon-
stratio”, “significatio”, “impositio” (or “positio”). “Significatio” is used in a generic
way, in the sense that each linguistic expression (categorematic) has a certain signi-
fication; for example, nouns mean SUBSTANCE + QUALITY, the verbs ACTION-
PASSION. . . The nominatio / denominatio / appellatio / denotatio is understood as
a relationship between proper and common nouns and single things. The determina-
tio is a relationship between a noun (say, “homo”), multiple forms (e.g., rationalitas,
gressibilitas ...), natures, essences, or status (esse homo or humanitas, esse animal or
animalitas, ...).3
3There are different stylistic variants of“determinatio”as the formulas suggest: “’man’ determines
the nature of animal; ’man’ denotes the same nature; an individual expression denotes no nature
or form; (a second substance) designates also the nature of essence; he who invented the word [...]
considered the nature of the thing and to indicate it imposed the name on it.” (My translation,
by transliterating the terms.) The terminological diversification is due, on the one hand, to the
“stratified” character of the Boethian commentaries; on the other hand, to the different use of notions
in the logical-grammatical tradition. The translated citations are taken from the following Abelardian
passages of his Logica Ingredientibus (in order): 157, 40-42; 171, 3-4; 50, 20; 157, 39-40; 112, 34-36.
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Abelard (sd/1919–27) claims as an original idea to have proposed a semantic
tertia lectio of the Boethian texts. It is not so important whether he is right or
not–in fact, he is wrong–but what matters is why he believes that taking a semantic
perspective is a safer choice than the different positions of realism. It seems that
speaking of meanings is less demanding than speaking directly of essences, properties,
or wholeness; the impression, however, lasts until one is asked to provide explanations
on the ontological status of meanings.
2 Some Peripheral Considerations
In the historical perspective, the choice of an ontology is challenging: we choose for
instance totalities of things rather than essences, because we think that reality is
fragmented into parts having some congruence. However, the ontological table that
we prefer, from a different point of view, is presented as a list of items, as such not
too different from other ordinary lists, apart from perhaps the lack of effectiveness of
the ordering and the convenience in finding the listed things. Take a segment of the
Aristotelian biological classification system, as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: A fragment of the Aristotelian biological classification. (Source: [1].)
Cf. Abelard (sd/1919-27).
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We can imagine dealing with species / genera of which we are required to provide
ontological credentials or simply with a list of things. One arranges cages or shelves,
putting tags or identification codes and inside books, animals, or other things. For
most of these activities a particular philosophical competence is not required; rather,
in some cases, the ability to interact with the inhabitants of the cages. The same or
similar things can be said for the medical lists referred to in Augusto’s article.
There are potentially dangerous animals in cages and useful things in some boxes.
In my computer there are directories and (sub. . . ) sub-directories, and sophisticated
search systems are also available. One does not always have to pay attention to what
is in a cage, partly because robots are able to do it without taking any risks. Classi-
fication systems are useful for finding things in (virtual) cages. I am not an expert in
formal ontologies, but apart from the suggestive name, the goal seems to me to have
an efficient way of finding information. On the other hand, philosophical classifica-
tions are not generally conceived with the aim of finding information or looking for
things arranged in some warehouse. Aristotle’s categories ultimately have limited or
no utility, even understood as a system of grammatical classification.
A famous motto says “to be is to be the value of a quantification variable.” I have
always had problems understanding this dogma: it seems that Quine in formulating
it was thinking about what one had to accept in order to clear the logic of higher-
order predicates. A point of view shared by mathematicians is to minimize the basic
notions and axioms, while not losing sight of the completeness of a certain formal
system. However: Why should the philosopher be cautious in ontological spending?
It is not very clear to me what the answer is. A Quine nominalist thinks that one
should only accept individual things and the bare minimum that one needs. A first-
hand realist thinks that for each term there is a meaning available.
The author of the article I write in the margin of distinguishes between domain
ontologies, largely investigated solely by computer scientists, and upper ontologies,
also computer-based but which may be of interest to philosophers. His idea is to
build a bridge between the two fields, philosophy and computer science, via upper
ontologies. It seems to me that this reflects a way of considering philosophical research
as a producer of ideas that can be developed and clarified in scientific research. I am
reminded of a passage from Husserl’s Logical Researches where he talks about meaning
categories; at a certain point, the author emphasizes how the science of meanings will
deepen and clarify the problem investigated at a philosophical level. Husserl’s text
certainly had prophetic value, as the contemporary categorial grammar actually starts
from the concept of meaning category to build a complex theoretical system.4
This is a useful perspective for both science and philosophy. I would just like to
modestly add a word of warning about the intentions and objectives which, being
different, could lead philosophical and scientific research onto two divergent paths.
From what I have been able to see and study, as I said in the previous pages, it
is very important for a certain philosophical tradition to succeed in identifying the
ultimate elements of reality, in the belief that the truth of ordinary sentences reflects
4Let me quote the passage from Husserl’s Logical Investigations: “An actual exposition of the
pure theory we are thinking of here should define all concepts with mathematical exactness and
deduce the theorems by argumenta in forma, i.e. mathematically [...] the progress that leads from
theories and from vague conceptual constructions to mathematically exact theories and conceptual
constructions is here, as always, the precondition for a full understanding of a priori connections and
an indispensable requirement of science” (LR III, 24, 287-288). (cf. Husserl, 1913/2006-8.)
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the world as described by philosophy. Conversely, the compilation of lists such as
those considered by the author (cf. dental technician or mechanical examples) must
have a practical utility, like all lists. It can be a matter of reckoning, cataloging, or
finding information. A well-organized cataloging system is essential for this purpose.
At a certain point, the author talks about Zeitgeist , intended, I believe, as a
cultural environment in which some linguistic practices are defined. These practices
can and should be the object of study for philosophy and science, but the abstraction
made by our way of ordering objects and using expressions to label classes is not
always reversible. Scientific abstraction is, in general: I start from a simple operation
such as adding objects or grouping them and end up considering algebraic properties
of structures. The exemplification of abstract objects brings me back to ordinary
use. Not so in metaphysics: certainly ordinary use is always at the beginning, but the
abstractive process is often not reversible: I see Socrates, I speak of him as a substance;
if I try to exemplify the abstract concept of substance, do I still get Socrates?
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